The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause by Sholley, John B.
THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE*
Jom B. SHoLLEYt
ON MARCH 4, 1935, the United States Supreme Court held in
Baldwin v. Seelig, that the state of New York had no power to
protect its milk Producers against underselling by the producers
of other states even though the former were by law forbidden to sell below
prescribed prices,2 and the resulting competition would go far to wreck
the whole statutory system. The particular statute condemned forbade in
effect the sale of imported milk in New York unless its producers had been
paid the equivalent of the New York standard price. The gist of the opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Cardozo is contained in the following excerpts:
If New York, in order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers, may guard
them against competition with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has been opened
to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce be-
tween the states to the power of the nation.3
What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another may not
place itself in a position of economic isolation. Formulas and catchwords are subor-
dinate to this overmastering requirement. Neither the power to tax nor the police power
may be used by the state of destination with the aim and effect of establishing an economic
barrier against competition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents.
Restrictions so contrived are an unreasonable clog upon the mobility of commerce.
They set up what is equivalent to a rampart of customs duties designed to neutralize
advantages belonging to the place of origin. They are thus hostile in conception as well
* The title was suggested by Professor Malcolm P. Sharp of the University of Chicago Law
School who furnished many other valuable suggestions and criticisms, both in person and
through the medium of his article, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication, 46 Harv. L.
Rev. 593-6io, 623-25 (1933). For other discussions of the subject-matter of this paper, see
Reynolds, The Distribution of Power to Regulate Interstate Carriers between the Nation and
the States 76-116, 147-55 (1928); Prentice and Egan, The Commerce Clause 1-42 (i898);
Gavit, The Commerce Clause 1-31 (1932).
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; Raymond Fellow, University of
Chicago Law School, 1935-36.
" 294 U.S. 51 (1935).
2The purely intrastate features of the New York Milk Control Act were held constitutional
in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) and Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S.
163 (1934). The act set up administrative machinery with authority to fix a scale of minimum
prices from producer to consumer. It was upheld as a reasonable means of promoting the
economic welfare of a paramount industry of the state and of protecting the health of the
public.
3 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522 (i935).
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as burdensome in result. The form of the packages in such circumstances is immate-
rial, whether they are original or broken. The importer must be free from imposts
framed for the very purpose of suppressing competition from without and leading in-
escapably to the suppression so intended.4
It is one thing for a state to exact adherence by an importer to fitting standards of
sanitation before the products of the farm or factory may be sold in its markets. It is a
very different thing to establish a wage scale or a scale of prices for use in other states,
and to bar the sale of the products, whether in the original packages or in others, unless
the scale has been observed.s
Just a year later, on March 2, 1936 the Supreme Court held in Whitfield
v. Ohio6 that the state of Ohio had the power to prohibit the sale of convict-
made goods within its borders whether imported or not, at least when
sanctioned by Congress. 7 Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion contained the
following passages:
The view of the state of Ohio that the sale of convict-made goods in competition
with the products of free labor is an evil, finds ample support in fact and in the similar
legislation of a preponderant number of the other states. Acts of Congress relating to
the subject also recognize the evil .....
All such legislation, state and federal, proceeds upon the view that free labor, properly
compensated, cannot compete successfully with the enforced and unpaid or underpaid con-
vict labor of the prison. A state basing its legislation upon that conception has the right
and power, so far as the federal Constitution is concerned, by non-discriminating legis-
lation, to preserve its policy from impairment or defeat, by any means appropriate to
the end and not inconsistent with that instrument. The proposition is not contested that
the Ohio statute would be unassailable if mnade to take effect after a sale in the original pack-
age. And the statute as it now reads is equally unassailable, since Congress has pro-
vided that the particular subjects of interstate commerce here involved "shall be gov-
erned by a rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than
would otherwise be the case," In re Rahrer (14O U.S. 545, 562) namely upon arrival
and delivery.
.... Even without such action by Congress the unbroken-package doctrine, as
applied to interstate commerce, has come to be regarded, generally at least, as more
artificial than sound.8
The clear inference is that the result would have been the same in the ab-
sence of the Act of Congress. No mention whatsoever was made of Baldwin
4 Id. at 527 (italics added). s Id. at 528.
6 56 Sup. Ct. 532 (1936). For further comment on this case, see note, Power of Congress to
Subject Interstate Commerce to State Regulation, post, p. 636.
7The Hawes-Cooper Act, 45 Stat. 1o84 (1929), 49 U.S.C.A. § 6o (1935), passed Jan. I9,
1929 and effective Jan. 19, 1934, provides that all convict-made goods shall be subject to the
laws of a state upon arrival and delivery therein for use, sale, or storage to the same extent as
though such goods had been produced therein and shall not be exempt by reason of being
introduced or sold in the original package.
8Whitfield v. Ohio, 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 535 (1936) (italics added).
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v. Seelig, yet Mr. Justice Cardozo was one of the six justices subscribing to
the opinion.9
Rarely, if ever, has the Supreme Court delivered opinions as incon-
sistent in tenor as these two within such a short space of time. The actual
holdings of the two cases can perhaps be reconciled-this point will be
dealt with later-but not on the reasoning contained in the opinions. We
are not told why the "ultimate principle" and "overmastering require-
ment" which moved the Court to strike down the New York statute were
not equally effective in the Whitfield case. Surely a Constitution which
expressly sanctioned the institution of human slavery for seventy-six years
cannot now be read as outlawing all prison industry and excluding the
products thereof from the protection afforded other property.0 The rea-
son lies deeper. The inconsistency in the opinions results from different
constructions of the Constitution itself-specifically, of the commerce
clause as a limitation on state power.
The negative implications of the commerce clause have always troubled
the Supreme Court. Not only has there been the usual difficulty involved
in applying a general principle to varying factual situations, but there has
been radical disagreement as to the fundamental principle itself. Many
doctrines and formulas have been advanced from time to time with vary-
ing success, but none has been suggested at once broad enough to compre-
hend the results which the Court has reached and definite enough to be of
much value in forecasting future decisions. The Supreme Court has, it
would appear, frequently pursued the policy of deciding the case before
it in accordance with its conception of what the national welfare requires,
then rationalizing and, when possible, reconciling its decision with the
language used in prior opinions. That such is the present policy of the
Court is demonstrated by the two cases mentioned above.
Although from the standpoint of the businessman and the statesman
this pragmatic handling of one of the most difficult problems arising from
our federal system has been on the whole a success, it does not satisfy the
constitutional theorist who professes to believe that the Supreme Court is
mechanically separating the sheep from the goats by applying an un-
changing and unambiguous constitutional standard to acts of legislation,""
9 Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Stone concurred in the result in the Whitfield
case, without indicating wherein they differed from the reasoning of Justice Sutherland.
10 See the remarks of McLean, J. in Groves v. Slaughter, i5 Pet. (U.S.) 449, 507-8 (1841),
and those of Baldwin, J., id. at 513.
11 justice Roberts is one of the leading exponents of this view. Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 346 (1935); United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 318 (1936).
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nor the traditional common lawyer who believes that certainty and con-
tinuity in the law are indispensable. Moreover, the refusal of the Supreme
Court to follow its own lead, or, rather, to select finally one or the other
of competing principles, makes it impossible for legislative bodies, the
lower courts, and attorneys to forecast its attitude on novel legislation
and guide themselves accordingly. Despite its modest professions to the
contrary the Supreme Court has always played a large part in directing
the development of statutory law by pointing out the directions in which
it will be permitted to grow. The satisfactory performance of this impor-
tant function demands consistency at least in the selection of funda-
mental principles, if not in their application.
It is the purpose of this paper to sketch in broad outline the judicial
history of the commerce clause as a limitation on the powers of the states.
From the outset there have been two competing principles. The one is
that the Constitution itself denies to the states all power to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce, herein referred to as the exclusive theory; the
other is that the states retain their powers in respect to those subjects
until Congress supersedes their authority by an exercise of its superior
power, 2 herein called, inaccurately, the concurrent theory. Although both
theories contemplate a rather extensive curtailment of the power of the
states to regulate the conduct of interstate and foreign commerce, they
differ as to which organ of the federal government, the Supreme Court or
Congress, shall define the sphere of state power. A number of syntheses
and compromises have been advanced from time to time, but the under-
lying conflict has persisted.
THE CONSTITUTION
There can be no doubt that two of the chief defects of the Articles of
Confederation were the lack of power in Congress to regulate foreign and
interstate commerce, and the presence of power in the various states to do
so. The results were inability to present a united front to foreign nations
and the existence of commercial rivalries and reprisals at home.' 3 The de-
sire to remedy these evils was probably the chief motive for calling the
The closely allied problem of determining how far congressional legislation supersedes
state legislation not actually inconsistent therewith, the so-called "occupation of the field"
doctrine, is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. For early judicial discussions, see Houston
v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) i (1820); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 6 Pet. (U.S.) 539 (r842). For
recent discussions, see Gavit, op. cit. supra note*, 247-264; Grant, The Scope and Nature of
Concurrent Power, 34 Col. L. Rev. 995, ioi9-23 (1934).
13 Hamilton, The Federalist, nos. 7, ii, 22; Madison, id., no. 42. Johnson, J., in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) I, 224-5 (1824); Marshall, C. J., in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.
(U.S.) 419, 445-6 (1827); 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 504-6 (1833).
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Convention of 1787.14 But it does not follow that once the framers met to
draft the new plan of government the subject of commercial regulation
was foremost in their minds,15 or that this factor was of controlling force in
securing the adoption of the Constitution.16 Much less is one warranted in
jumping to the conclusion that the Constitution as drafted and adopted
necessarily foreclosed all possibility of the recurrence of those evils which
caused the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation. The primary
source for the determination of the purpose and the effect of any legal
document is the words contained therein. In the language of Chief Justice
Marshall:
.... although the spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be re-
spected not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words.
It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrinsic circumstances, that a case
for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its
operation. Where words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of an in-
strument bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent, unless the natural and com-
mon import of words be varied, construction becomes necessary, and a departure from
the obvious meaning of words is justifiable. But if, in any case, the plain meaning of
a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be
disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what
'4 See i Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 122-55 (2d ed. 1836) for the steps
leading to the calling of the Convention. "Before the Constitution existed, the States taxed
the commerce and intercourse of each other. This was the leading cause of abandoning the
Confederation and forming the Constitution,-more than all other causes it led to the result."
Catron, J., in Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U.S.) 283, 445 (r849).
sThere was very little debate on the clauses relative to commercial regulation. See War-
ren, Making of the Constitution 567-89 (1928). There was some reluctance on the part of
southern delegates to vest the power in Congress. Id. at 58o et seq. Cf. Madison's statement in
The Federalist, no. 45: "The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power [of Congress];
but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are en-
tertained."
A '"The principal purposes to be answered by union are these: The common defence of the
members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external
attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations, and between the states; the superin-
tendance of our intercourse, politics and commercial, with foreign countries." Hamilton, The
Federalist, no. 23. Madison's listing of the chief powers conferred on the new federal govern-
ment gave the commerce power a more prominent place. Id., no. 41. There appears to have
been little debate on the subject in the ratifying conventions, probably because, as Madison
suggests, there was general agreement that national control was necessary. There were some
misgivings, however, in the southern states. An amendment was proposed by both the Vir-
ginia and North Carolina conventions to require a two-thirds vote in each house of Congress to
enact commercial regulations. 3 Elliot, Debates 65o; 4 id. at 241.
"If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it
was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial
restraints.'! Gibbous v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 231 (1824), per Johnson, J. This statement
seems unduly broad.
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they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision
to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite
in rejecting the application.x7
The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The inquiry is thus
twofold: first, a determination of the extent to which the states are ex-
pressly forbidden to regulate interstate and foreign commerce; and second,
a determination of the extent to which the delegation of commercial
power to Congress impliedly divests the states of power.
Certain subjects of importance to the commercial interests of the coun-
try are absolutely removed from state control. "No State shall enter into
any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; .... coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts; pass any .... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."' 8 In
certain other respects the states are forbidden to act in a manner incon-
sistent with the ideal of national unity. "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof."' 9 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.' '2 0 The
presence of these specific prohibitions suggests certain questions: Why, if
the framers intended to exclude the states from the regulation of inter-
state and foreign commerce, did they not do so expressly?" Why were not
the products of other states, as well as their citizens, expressly protected
from discriminatory state action? One possible answer is that the framers
were naturally reluctant to circumscribe the sphere of state action too
X7 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 122, 202-3 (18ig). See also Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 644-5 (1819), per Marshall, C. J.; Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U.S. 211, 227-8 (1899), per Peckham, J. But cf. Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch (U.S.) 87, 137 (I8io), per Marshall, C. J., and id. at i44-S, per Johnson, J.
X8 U.S. Const., art. x, § io, cl. z. '9 Id., art. 4, § x. 20 Id., art. 4, § 2, cl. 1.
u Warren, op. cit. supia note i5, at 570, states that the question as to the exclusiveness of
the commercial power of Congress was not foreseen by the framers. "At the formation of the
Constitution, the power to regulate commerce attracted but little attention, compared with
that to impose duties on imports and tonnage; and this last had caused so much difficulty,
both at home and abroad, that it was expressly and entirely taken away from the States, but
the former was not attempted to be. The former, too, occupies scarce a page in The Federalist,
while the latter engrosses several numbers. A like disparity existed in the debates in the Con-
vention, and in the early legislation of Congress. Nor did the former receive much notice of the
profession in construing the Constitution till after a quarter of a century." Passenger Cases, 7
How. (U.S.) 283, 545 (r849), per Woodbury, J.
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sharply in advance of any experience under the new system. Another is
that such patently extensive restrictions on the "sovereign" states would
have jeopardized the chance of adoption.
Next there are a group of conditional restraints on state power. "No
state shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of
the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to
the Revision and Controul of the Congress."2 "No State shall, without
the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, .... or enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.' 2 3
It was the exercise of these powers which aroused the greatest dissatisfac-
tion under the Articles of Confederation. Hence it might reasonably be
argued that in all other respects the states were left free to regulate inter-
state and foreign commerce. Chief Justice Marshall, however, pointed out
that these limitations, except of course the last, are imposed on the taxing
power of the states, a power obviously not surrendered, and therefore it
was necessary to set them out in detail.24 A more difficult argument for
the proponents of the exclusive theory to refute is that the delegation to
Congress of supervisory power over the matters of state commercial com-
pacts and duties on imports, exports and tonnage is a clear indication that
Congress was intended to exercise a similar control over other state pow-
ers whose exercise affects interstate and foreign commerce, the difference
being that in respect of the matters listed in the second and third clauses
of Article Ten, the silence of Congress must be construed as a denial of
permission to the states to act, whereas in respect of other matters less
likely to burden commerce its silence is of no effect, leaving the states free
to act.25 The answer of Justice Johnson to this contention, that the
clauses in question define the limits within which Congress may consent to
state action, seems somewhat strained.'6
"U.S. Const., art. i, § 1o, cl. 2. 23 Id., art. i, § 1o, cl. 3.
'4 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 200-3 (1824). But cf. p. 572 infra. For support for
the proposition that the taxing and commercial powers are distinguished throughout the Con-
stitution see 2 Tucker, The Constitution of the United States 520-3 (1899).
s See remarks of Woodbury, J. along this line. Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U.S.) 283, 558
(1849).
"But this whole clause, as to these two subjects, appears to have been introduced ex
abundanti cautda, to remove every temptation to an attempt to interfere with the powers of
Congress over commerce, and to show how far Congress might consent to permit the States to
exercise that power. Beyond those limits, even by the consent of Congress, they could not
exercise it." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 237 (1824).
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Two of the clauses limiting the commercial power of Congress have
some bearing on the question under discussion. "No Preference shall be
given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one
State over those of another. '2 It has been urged28 that this provision for-
bids all state regulations of navigation which would destroy the uniform-
ity contemplated by the Constitution. It is now well settled, however,
that this clause refers only to Congress and imposes no restraint on the
states.2 9 The use of this clause to lend weight to the argument that na-
tional uniformity of regulation is strongly implied by the Constitution and
therefore state action is excluded, can be offset to some extent by pointing
out that the reason for the inclusion of the clause was to prevent con-
gressional regulations favorable to the powerful states.30
"The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight."'3
From this it was argued that since the Constitution here expressly recog-
nizes the power of the states to control foreign commerce in persons, it
must contemplate the existence of the power over other articles as well.
Chief Justice Marshall met this contention by construing the clause as
excepting for a limited time the preexisting state power over this phase of
foreign commerce from the otherwise complete delegation to Congress.32
It can be concluded that the ancillary commercial clauses of the Con-
stitution do not, in themselves, decisively support either the exclusive or
the concurrent theory. Perhaps the most significant fact is the grant of
power to Congress to supervise and control state action in the matters of
duties on imports, exports, and tonnage, of commercial compacts, and
under the full faith and credit clause. These provisions together with the
supremacy clause 33 are more consistent with the concurrent theory, which
is that Congress in its discretion can abrogate such state regulation of for-
27 U.S. Const., art. i, § 9, cl. 6.
29 Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U.S.) 283, 414 (1849), per Wayne, J., in reference to a state
law imposing a duty on the landing of immigrant passengers.
29 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, x35 (1877); Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455,467 (1886).
3o Warren, op. cit. supra note 15, at 586-8. 31 U.S. Const., art. i, § 9, cl. i.
32 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) i, 2o6-7 (1824).
33 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
U.S. Const., art. 6, cl. 2.
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eign and interstate commerce as are deemed contrary to the national
interest3 4
The wording of the general commerce clause---"The Congress shall have
Power .... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes"5-of itself neither excludes
nor reserves a concurrent, subordinate power in the states. But although
not expressly made so, yet the grant of power to Congress may be exclu-
sive in fact because of its very nature.
.... it has never been supposed, that this concurrent power of legislation extended
to every possible case in which its exercise by the States has not been expressly pro-
hibited. The confusion resulting from such a practice would be endless ..... When-
ever the terms in which a power is granted to Congress, or the nature of the power,
require that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, the subject is as complete-
ly taken from the State Legislatures, as if they had been expressly forbidden to act
on it.36
On the other hand it is not lightly to be assumed that the powers grant-
ed to Congress are exclusive by nature. Mr. Justice Story's statement on
this point is the accepted doctrine.
The constitution containing a grant of powers in many instances similar to those
already existing in the State governments, and some of these being of vital importance
also to State authority and State legislation, it is not to be admitted that a mere grant
of such powers in affirmative terms to Congress, does, per se, transfer an exclusive
sovereignty on such subjects to the latter. On the contrary, a reasonable interpreta-
tion of that instrument necessarily leads to the conclusion, that the powers so granted
are never exclusive of similar powers existing in the States, unless where the constitu-
tion has expressly in terms given an exclusive power to Congress, or the exertion of a
like power is prohibited to the States, or there is a direct repugnancy or incompatibility
in the exercise of it by the States.37
The problem thus becomes narrowed down to a determination of
whether the regulation of the conduct of foreign and interstate commerce
by the states is necessarily repugnant to and inconsistent with the exist-
ence of a similar power in Congress whether the latter has been exercised
34 Madison, in The Federalist, no. 42, speaks of the "necessity of a superintending authority
over the reciprocal trade of confederated states," language more suitable to describe a legisla-
ture than a court. For a similar conclusion see Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution
207 (1922).
3s U.S. Const., art. i, § 8, cl. 3.
36 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 122, 193 (18ig), per Marshall, C. J.
3" Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 48-49 (182o), holding the militia power to be con-
current. The last sentence quoted is a paraphrase of Hamilton's statement in The Federalist,
no. 32.
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in regard to such conduct or not.38 In this connection it is interesting to
observe that several comparable grants of power to Congress have been
held not to exclude state action3 9
CHANCELLOR KENT V. DANIEL WEBSTER
The first litigation involving the negative implications of the commerce
clause arose in connection with the famous New York steamboat monop-
oly. Livingston and Fulton, in consideration of the time and money they
had expended in the successful development of steam as a motive power
for boats, were granted an exclusive thirty-year franchise to operate
steamboats on the waters of New York by the state legislature. In i8ii
they brought a bill to enjoin the operation of a competing steamboat
which was carrying passengers between New York City and Albany.
Chancellor Lansing dismissed the bill, but his decision was reversed and
the injunction granted by the Court of Errors in Livingston v. Van Ingen.40
The respondent's chief contention was that the New York statute
granting the monopoly was void because in conflict with the exclusive
powers of Congress to issue patents and regulate interstate and foreign
commerce. The court was unanimous in denying this contention. The
principal opinion was written by Chief Justice Kent, the most renowned
jurist of that day. He began with a general consideration of the exclusive-
ness of congressional powers. The conclusion reached on this point he
stated as follows:
Our safe rule of construction and of action is this, that if any given power was origi-
nally vested in this state, if it has not been exclusively ceded to congress, or if the exer-
cise of it has not been prohibited to the states, we may then go on in the exercise of the
power until it comes practically in collision with the actual exercise of some congres-
38 In one of the earliest American legal textbooks, Judge St. George Tucker of Virginia
stated, without giving any reason for his opinion, that the commercial power of Congress was
exclusive. i Tucker's Blackstone's Commentaries, Appendix i8o (183). This opinion is re-
markable in view of the fact that Judge Tucker advocated strict construction of federal powers.
Id., Appendix 154.
39 Taxing power, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 425 (i8ig), per Marshall,
C. J.; bankruptcy power. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 122, 195-7 (i819), per
Marshall, C. J. (see excerpt set out in note 6o infra); Ogden v. Saunders, z2 Wheat. (U.S.) 213,
273-81 (1827), per Johnson, J. (good discussion); militia power, see note 37 supra. Contra:
naturalization power, Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. (U.S.) 259, 269 (1817), per Marshall, C. J.
(distinguished, Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) i, 36 (1824), per Oakley, arguendo). For
conflicting views as to the exclusiveness of the power of Congress to legislate for the recovery of
fugitive slaves, see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, i6 Pet. (U.S.) 539, 622-5, 627-33, 635-6, 638-48,
652-8, 66o-3 (1842), wherein several diverse theories are set forth.
4G 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 507 (1812).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
sional power. When that happens to be the case, the state authority will so far be con-
trolled, but it will still be good in all those respects in which it does not absolutely
contravene the provision of the paramount law."
The distinguished Chief Justice then turned to the commerce clause and
pointed out the impossibility of drawing a definite line between external
commerce, asserted to be under the exclusive control of Congress, and in-
ternal commerce, admitted to be within the exclusive control of the states.
The rule just stated, he believed, would eliminate much of the difficulty:
There can be no other safe or practicable rule of conduct ..... Whenever the case
shall arise of an exercise of power by congress which shall be directly repugnant and
destructive to the use and enjoyment of the appellants' grant, it would fall under the
cognisance of the federal courts, and they would, of course, take care that the laws of
the union are duly supported ..... But when there is no existing regulation which
interferes with the grant, nor any pretence of a constitutional interdict, it would be
most extraordinary for us to adjudge it void, on the mere contingency of a collision
with some future exercise of congressional power. Such a doctrine is a monstrous
heresy. It would go, in a great degree, to annihilate the legislative power of the states.42
May not a state forbid the circulation of bank notes of face value of less
than one dollar, or lottery tickets, even though Congress at some future
time might establish national banks with authority to issue fractional cur-
rency or a national lottery? The fact that New York may now, or in the
future, abuse its power over its navigable waters is no reason to say that
no such power exists. Congress can remedy the situation if it finds that
commerce is being improperly burdened. This opinion stands as one of
the ablest presentations of the concurrent power theory in the reports.43
,As the efficiency of steamboats increased so did the resistance to the
New York monopoly. In 1819 Ogden, a licensee of Livingston and Fulton,
filed a bill before the former Chief Justice, now Chancellor Kent praying
that one Gibbons be enjoined from operating a steamboat in New York
Bay. The defendant held a federal coasting license and was carrying pas-
sengers between Elizabethtown, New Jersey and New York City. The
4' Id. at 576. This conclusion was fortified by a reference to the rule laid down in The Feder-
alist, no. 32 (note 37 supra) which was said to be of great influence in persuading certain state
conventions to adopt the Constitution. "Principles of construction solemnly sanctioned at
that day, and flowing from such sources, are to be regarded by us, and by posterity, as coming
in the language of truth, and with the force of authority." Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns.
(N.Y.) 507, 577 (I812).
4Id. at 578.
43 Concurring opinions were delivered by Yates and Thompson, JJ. The latter was ap-
pointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1823. He did not participate in the decision of
Gibbons v. Ogden, but his dissent in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 449 (1827)
and his separate opinion in City of New York v. Miln, ii Pet. (U.S.) 102, 143 (1837) indicate
that his views on the commerce clause remained unchanged.
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injunction was granted on the authority of the previous case, the chan-
cellor holding that the license did not purport to authorize the licensee to
navigate wherever he chose free of state regulations, but was merely evi-
dence showing the American character of the vessel.44 The decree was
affirmed by the Court of Errors. 4
This time an appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court.
No effort was spared by the appellant. He retained as his counsel Daniel
Webster, the leading advocate of the day, and William Wirt, the Attorney
General of the United States. The task of overturning a decision sup-
ported not only by cogent reasoning but by the great prestige of Chan-
cellor Kent and the New York Court of Errors was no light one even for
such eminent counsel.
Webster's argument, which is ranked as one of his ablest, was, for those
days, remarkably concise, occupying but thirty pages in the report.46 He
dwelt first on the friction which had sprung up between New York and the
adjacent states as a result of the monopoly. Connecticut had enacted a
statute forbidding a New York licensee from entering its waters, and New
Jersey had provided that any licensee who interfered with a New Jersey
citizen would be liable to the latter in treble damages.47 He then adverted
to the causes leading to the adoption of the Constitution and asserted that
the desire and intent to remove the possibility of hostile and provocative
regulations of commerce was the paramount motive inducing its adoption.
"Henceforth, the commerce of the States was to be an unit; and the system
by which it was to exist and be governed, must necessarily be complete,
entire, and uniform." ''  He argued that the power to regulate meant the
power to give the rule and establish the system, a power incapable of being
lodged in two bodies concurrently.49 It was not contended that the com-
mercial power of Congress was exclusive in all respects, but only that it
44 Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) i5o (I8i).
4s Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. (N.Y.) 488 (i82o).
46 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) i, 3-33 (1824).
47 Id. at 8-9. Wirt in his peroration exhorted the Court to intervene else this friction would
lead to civil war and the destruction of the Union. Id. at 183-6. It may well be that this argu-
ment had a great effect upon Marshall, a man who had devoted his life to building and pre-
serving the Union. Regardless of theory, the Union was in danger and Congress had taken no
steps to save it.
48 Id. at 14. "That the United States form, for many, and for most important purposes, a
single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are
one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people." Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 264, 413-4 (1821), per Marshall, C. J. This statement is dictum, but it
indicates that Marshall's preconception was in accord with Webster's argument.
49 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) z, I5-x6 (1824).
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was so as to "great commercial interests," such as monopolies of trade,
navigation laws, embargoes, and general regulations of foreign com-
merce.50 Webster found three flaws in Kent's concurrent power doctrine.
It would jeopardize the harmonious functioning of our federal system if
Congress were to undertake to overhaul and revise the legislation of the
states as a regular duty.1 Secondly, the uncontested power of the states
to regulate ferries, bridges, and turnpikes does not prove that the states
should and do retain the commercial power, since those regulations are
better classified as pertaining to the internal police power.5 2 The third
point is the most important:'
.... The States may legislate, it is said, wherever Congress has not made a plenary
exercise of its power. But who is to judge whether Congress has made this plenary
exercise of power? Congress has acted on this power; it has done all that it deemed
wise; and are the States now to do whatever Congress has left undone? Congress makes
such rules as, in its judgment, the case requires; and those rules, whatever they are,
constitute the system.
All useful regulation does not consist in restraint; and that which Congress sees fit to
leave free, is a part of its regulation, as much as the rest.s'
This language is susceptible of two constructions5 4 If Webster meant
that it would be improper for any body other than Congress to determine
the meaning of congressional inaction, then it supports the contention that
the power of Congress is immediately exclusive by virtue of the Constitu-
tion itself. On the other hand, it may be read as meaning that the con-
sidered silence of Congress is as effective as its legislation in superseding
state regulation. The former construction seems more consistent with the
rest of Webster's argument; the latter was destined to be revived many
years later in the form of the "silence of Congress" doctrine.
MARSHALL'S POTENT Dicta
Chief Justice John Marshall was more than a great judge, he was pri-
marily a great statesman. Ever working toward his life-long goal, the
creation of a strong central government, he missed no opportunity to fur-
ther that end. As a result, upon occasion he was guilty of departing from
accepted standards of judicial technique55 In Gibbons v. Ogden,s6 for ex-
50 Id. at 9-io, 13-14, IS-I6. 51 Id. at 16-7. 52 Id. at i8-ig. 53 Id. at 17-18.
54 A third is possible, i.e., that Webster was referring to a situation where Congress had
"occupied the field." See Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 200, 202, note 6
(1927).
ss For a criticism of Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch (U.S.) 137 (I8o3), from this standpoint,
see McLaughlin, Marbury vs. Madison Again, 14 Am. Bar Ass'n J. i55 (1928).
-6 9 Wheat. (U.S.) I (1824).
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ample, he violated what might be termed the judicial canon of economy
by discussing and stating his opinion on issues not necessary to the deci-
sion. That case, under Marshall's analysis, could have been decided with-
out touching upon the negative implications of the commerce clause-
indeed, the result would have been the same had Kent's views on that
point been adopted in toto.s7 All that Marshall actually decided was that
Congress had constitutional authority to enact the coasting license stat-
ute, that that statute conferred on a licensee the privilege to navigate upon
any coastal water in the United States,"8 and that the New York steam-
boat monopoly was an interference with that privilege.
Regardless of their unnecessary character, the dicta of the Chief Justice
in his opinion in this great and leading case have had a tremendous influ-
ence upon the development of the negative implications of the commerce
clause. The exclusive theory was given strong support in two ways. First,
Marshall undertook to refute the contrary arguments based on various
other clauses in the Constitution, as already mentioned5 9 But, more im-
portant, he stated the gist of Webster's argument and indicated that it
was persuasive to his mind.
It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, that, as the word "to regu-
late" implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, neces-
sarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same
thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which
remain as they were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole,
which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power de-
signs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated.
There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been
refuted.6o
57 Kent himself pointed this out with evident satisfaction. i Kent, Commentaries on Amer-
ican Law 405-13 (1826).
ss This is the weak link in the chain. Justice Johnson in his concurring opinion declared that
the sole purpose of the license was to prevent foreign vessels from evading the revenue laws.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) r, 231-3 (1824). It seems probable that Marshall stretched
a point here to avoid the necessity of definitely repudiating the concurrent theory.
59 See p. 562 SUpra.
6 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) i, 209 (1824). Marshall himself had made a good an-
swer to this argument some five years before. "It may be thought more convenient, that much
of it should be regulated by State legislation, and Congress may purposely omit to provide for
many cases to which their power extends. It does not appear to be a violent construction of
the constitution, and it is certainly a convenient one, to consider the power of the States as
existing over such cases as the laws of the Union may reach. B.ut be this as it may, the power
granted to Congress may be exercised or declined, as the wisdom of that body shall decide.
If, in the opinion of Congress, uniform laws concerning bankruptcies ought not to be estab-
lished, it does not follow that partial laws may not exist, or that State legislation of the sub-
ject must cease. It is not the mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which is incom-
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Guarded though this statement is, and despite the presence of an' ex-
press disclaimer to pagsing on the argument,6 it apparently has served as
the warrant for many statements that in Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme
Court held that the commerce power of Congress is exclusive.6
Equally important was the modification of the exclusive theory which
Marshall suggested. In speaking of the argument of respondent based on
the inspection clause, he said:
That inspection laws may have a remote and considerable influence on commerce,
will not be denied; but that a power to regulate commerce is the source from which the
right to pass them is derived, cannot be admitted ..... They form a portion of that
immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a
State, not surrendered to the general government; all which can be most advantageous-
ly exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of
every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and
those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass.6
This is what might be termed the doctrine of classification of powers.
The powers of a state are classified as regulation of interstate and foreign
commerce, regulation of internal commerce, police regulation for the pro-
tection of health and safety, and the taxing 4 power. To determine into
which category to put a given state statute, the purpose of the legislature
is looked to.65 Whether the exclusive theory is applicable to the first class
patible with the exercise of the same power by the States." Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4
Wheat. (U.S.) 122, 195-6 (i8ig).
It should be noted, however, that this answer does not meet the true exclusive power argu-
ment, i.e., that the Constitution itself demands that uniformity which results from exclusively
federal regulation regardless of Congress' opinion as to the wisdom of allowing the states to
regulate certain subjects, but it does weigh against the practical desirability of adopting that
argument. As pointed out above (p. 568), Webster's argument is not free from ambiguity.
61 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 200 (1824). Justice Johnson's concurring opinion
did squarely adopt Webster's argument as the sole basis of decision. Id. at 227, 231-2.
62 Rawle, View of the Constitution 8I-4 (2d ed. 1829); 2 Story, Commentaries on the Con-
stitution 513 (1833); North River Steam Boat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cowen (N.Y.) 711, 743
(1825), per Savage, C. J.; City of New York v. Miln, zi Pet. (U.S.) 102, 158-9 (1837), per
Story, J.; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. (U.S.) 449, 504-5 (184), per McLean, J.; id. at 511, per
Baldwin, J.
63 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 203 (X824). 64 Id. at 201-3.
65 Justice Johnson's opinion is explicit on this point. "It is no objection to the exercise of
distinct, substantive powers, that, in their application, they bear upon the same subject. The
same bale of goods, the same cask of provisions, or the same ship, that may be the subject of
commercial regulation, may also be the vehicle of disease. And the health laws that require
them to be stopped and ventilated, are no more intended as regulations on commerce, than the
laws which permit their importation, are intended to innoculate the community with disease.
Their different purposes mark the distinction between the powers brought into action; and while
frankly exercised, they can produce no serious collision." Id. at 235 (italics added).
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or not, it is not as to the rest. They are concurrent powers which can be
exercised freely in the absence of congressional action; but Marshall made
it clear that they are subject to being superseded by such action.6
The announcement of this doctrine was in effect a victory for states'
rights which offset in large part the support given to the exclusive theory
by the other dictum. At the same time it opened the door to greater judi-
cial power by introducing a highly elastic standard, the presumed legisla-
tive purpose, as a rule of decision. This was the first of many similar steps
which were destined to vest the Supreme Court with almost uncontrolled
superintendence of all state action affecting interstate and foreign com-
merce.
The classification of powers doctrine was directly applied in Willson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,67 to uphold a state's power to dam a naviga-
ble tidal inlet for the purpose of draining a marsh and removing a menace
to the health of the neighborhood. Marshall held that this obstruction of
navigation was not in contravention of the commerce clause, and was not
forbidden by the Coasting License Act.
Prior to this decision, however, Marshall had radically modified the
classification doctrine. Brown v. Maryland" involved a state license tax
imposed on wholesalers of foreign merchandise. The defendant, an unli-
censed importer, had been convicted of selling articles in the form in which
they were imported. The Chief Justice held that this was a violation of
that clause of the Constitution prohibiting a state from laying import
duties without the consent of Congress.69 This construction of the clause
was deemed necessary to prevent its ready evasion. The holding was lim-
ited to the facts, which circumstance led to the development of the "orig-
inal package" doctrine as a test for fixing the dividing line between state
and national control.70
This case demonstrated the dangers involved in leaving the taxing
power of the states free from all restraints except those specified in the
Constitution. Therefore Marshall undertook to work out a broader lim-
itation. As a second and distinct ground of decision he held that the tax in
6Id. at 210-11.
67 2 Pet. (U.S.) 245 (1829). This decision gave trouble to succeeding judges who maintained
that Marshall espoused the exclusive doctrine in its broader form. Passenger Cases, 7 How.
(U.S.) 283, 397-8 (849), per McLean, J.; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. (U.S.) 713, 743
(1866), per Clifford, J.
68 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419 (1827).
69 U.S. Const., art. i, § 1o, cl. 2, set out at p. 562 supra.
70 For brief discussions of the development of this doctrine, see Sharp, op. cit. supra note*,
at 6o4-io; also, 21 Va. L. Rev. 433 (r935).
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question was repugnant to the federal tariff statutes. The payment of the
tariff imposed by Congress, he said, confers on the importer not only the
right to import, but the right to sell, without which the former right would
be of little value. "Congress has a right, not only to authorize importa-
tion, but to authorize the importer to sell.117x And the tariff act will be so
construed. Thus the actual holding does not support the exclusive theory
any more than did that in Gibbons v. Ogden. But there are dicta in the
case which, while far from clear, look in that direction. 72 At least they in-
dicate that Marshall intended to revise his classification doctrine to re-
move the taxing power from the category of those regarded as concurrent
under all circumstances. At the same time he reaffirmed the power of the
states to exercise their police powers in the absence of inconsistent federal
legislation.73
This second part of Marshall's opinion was a bold and novel departure
from the accepted interpretation of the Constitution. To allay the fears
of the states that their revenues might be curtailed by the activities of the
proposed federal government, Hamilton had published the following state-
ment in The Federalist:
The individual states should possess an independent and uncontrolable authority
to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making this con-
cession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they
would, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and
unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to
abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted
by any article or clause of its constitution.74
A more emphatic denial of the applicability of the exclusive theory
could hardly be phrased. Taney, counsel for Maryland in the Brown case,
referred to it and pointed out that the people of the nation had relied on it
7' Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 447 (r827).
"The power claimed 1by the State is, in its nature, in conflict with that given to Con-
gress." Id. at 447. "We admit this power [taxing] to be sacred; but cannot admit that it may
be used so as to obstruct the free course of a power given to Congress. We cannot admit, that
it may be used so as to obstruct or defeat the power to regulate commerce." Id. at 448. "Or
whatshould iestrain a State from taxing any article passing through it from one State to
another, for the purpose of traffic? .... These cases are all within the sovereign power of
taxation, but would obviously derange the measures of Congress to regulate commerce, and
affect materially the purpose for which that power was given." Id. at 449.
73 Id. at 443-4.
74 The Federalist, no. 32. "A law abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by
the authority of a state, (unless upon imports and exports) would not be the supreme law of
the land, but an usurpation of a power not granted by the constitution." Id., no. 33. PTrima
facie this looks inconsistent with the supremacy clause (note 33 supra), but Hamilton probably
meant that it would never be "necessary" or "proper" for Congress to take such steps.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
when they adopted the Constitution75 Nevertheless, Marshall, who had
already established one implied limitation on the taxing power of the
states,76 began the process of creating another and far more important one,
a process not to be completed for nearly half a century.7 7
CONFLICT AND COMfPROMI[SE UNDER TANEY
Not long after the ascension of Taney to the chief justiceship, it became
apparent that his predecessor's attempt to settle the controversy as to the
interpretation of the commerce clause had been far from successful. The
diversity of opinion on this point among the members of the Supreme
Court was exhibited in the case of City of New York v. Miln.7 The major-
ity of the Court upheld a statute requiring the masters of all vessels land-
ing immigrants to file a report with the mayor giving information as to
such persons. Justice Barbour, who wrote the prevailing opinion, based
the decision on the ground that the statute was an exercise of the police
power to protect the community against paupers and criminals, and was
not in conflict with any federal statutes. He relied on Marshall's classifica-
tion of powers doctrine, and denied the application of the exclusive theory
as to the police power in strong terms. 79 Justice Thompson, Kent's former
colleague, delivered a concurring opinion in which he said that regardless
of whether the state was to be regarded as exercising its police or its com-
mercial power, the statute was valid in the absence of conflicting federal
legislation. s °
Justice Story delivered a dissenting opinion in which he espoused the
exclusive theory as qualified by the classification doctrine,8! but his con-
7s Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 429-31 (1827).
7 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316 (i8ig), holding that federal governmental
instrumentalities are exempt from state taxation, based on the supremacy clause and the lack
of jurisdiction of the state, in the sense of power to create and regulate the Bank of the United
States.
7 State Freight Tax Case, i5 Wall. (U.S.) 232 (1873), p. 58o infra, was the first case square-
ly applying the exclusive theory to invalidate a state tax. In the interval Hamilton's interpre-
tation was accepted doctrine. 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 410-12 (1833).
"The States may unquestionably tax the subjects of commerce; and no necessary conflict with
that complete control which is vested in Congress appears until the power is so exercised as to
defeat or embarrass the congressional legislation. Where Congress has not acted at all upon the
subject, the State taxation cannot be invalid on this ground." Cooley, Constitutional Limita-
tions 486 (1868).
79 11 Pet. (U.S.) 102 (1837).
79 "All those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps,
more properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained; and that, conse-
quently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive."
Id. at i39.
So Id. at 152. 81 Id. at 156.
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ception of the latter was quite different from that announced by Marshall
and Johnson in Gibbons v. Ogden. "But how can it be truly said, that the
act of New York is not a regulation of commerce? No one can well doubt,
that if the same act had been passed by congress it would have been a
regulation of commerce; and in that way, and in that way only, would it
be a constitutional act of congress. ' 'S2 Hence it must be classified as a
regulation of foreign commerce when enacted by a state. This approach,
of course, practically destroys the classification doctrine, and amounts to
an adoption of the exclusive theory in its extreme form. Chief Justice
Marshall, according to Story, had concurred in these views after the
first hearing of the case. 3
The conflict of views among the members of the Court increased with
the years. In 1847, the Court was unanimous in holding in the License
Cases 4 that state statutes prohibiting the sale of liquor by unlicensed
vendors could be validly applied to a retail vendor of foreign liquor and
to an importer selling liquor imported from another state in the barrel in
which it was imported. All of the judges agreed that the power of Con-
gress could extend no further than the authorization of the importer to
sell in the original packages, and that the police power of the states could,
in the silence of Congress, be extended to prohibit sales of interstate im-
ports even in the original packages. There was a sharp division, however,
as to the reasoning on which the latter holding was based.
Justices McLean and Grier followed the modified exclusive theory as
outlined in Gibbons v. Ogden, stating that although the states have no
power to regulate external commerce for the purpose of bettering the con-
ditions of its conduct, they can do so when the purpose is to protect the
health, safety, or morals of their citizens.85
Five members86 of the Court, led by Chief Justice Taney, based the de-
cision on the concurrent theory of Chancellor Kent. They denied that the
exclusive theory could be justified as a valid interpretation of the Consti-
tution,87 and pointed out that no case had actually applied that theory as
12Id. at 157.
3 Id. at 16I. Justice Story must be classed as the most wholehearted advocate of the exclu-
sive theory in this period.
845 How. (U.S.) 504 (i847). 85Id. at 588-93, 631-2.
"Catron, Daniel, Woodbury, JJ., delivered separate opinions. Nelson, J., indicated his con-
currence with Taney, C. J., and Catron, J. The remaining two justices who heard the case,
Wayne and McKinley, probably agreed with McLean rather than Taney. See note 93 infra.
87License Cases, 5 How. (U.S.) 504, 578-So (1847), per Taney, C. J.; id. at 6o5-8, per
Catron, J.
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the basis of decision." Nor would they admit that the modified form of
the exclusive theory was a satisfactory solution. They criticized the classi-
fication doctrine on the grounds that it did not square with governmental
practice, and was both illogical and impracticable.
Chief Justice Taney vigorously attacked the propriety of judicial at-
tempts to classify legislation according to the supposed motives of the
legislature.
But what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than the
powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And
whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offences, or to establish
courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate com-
merce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same powers; that is to say,
the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its
dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates; and its authority to make
regulations of commerce is as absolute as its power to pass health laws, except in so far
as it has been restricted by the constitution of the United States .....
Upon this question the object and motive of the State are of no importance, and
cannot influence the decision. It is a question of power.89
Furthermore, continued the Chief Justice, regardless of the obvious
difficulty of determining the legislative motive in many cases, 90 the classi-
fication variation of the exclusive theory limits the states too much on one
hand and not enough on the other. For half a century and more Congress
had permitted the regulation of pilotage to be handled locally, yet this was
a "commercial" regulation of foreign commerce. Would it now be urged
that all state pilotage laws are and always have been unconstitutional? 9'
Again, would it be admitted that the states may, as a health measure, cut
off all commerce in an article by forbidding its sale and use?
92
The Passenger Cases,93 decided two years later, were of little importance
88 Id. at 581-4, per Taney, C. J.; id. at 602-5, per Catron, J.
89 Id. at 583.
90 Justice Thompson pointed out this difficulty in City of New York v. Miln, ii Pet. (U.S.)
102, 152-3 (1837).
91 License Cases, 5 How. (U.S.) 5o4, 58o-i (1847), per Taney, C. J.; id. at 6o6-7, per
Catron, J.
91 Id. at 6co-i, per Catron, J. This question was to trouble the Court many years later.
See p. 584 infra.
93 7 How. (U.S.) 283 (1849), holding invalid statutes imposing fees on masters of vessels for
each immigrant landed. Two justices, McLean and Wayne, based the decision on both the
exclusive theory and repugnance to federal statutes and treaties. Catron, McKinley, and
Grier, JJ., concurred, relying on the latter ground. Taney, C. J., Daniel, Nelson, and Wood-
bury, JJ., dissented. The Chief Justice contended inter aia that the concurrent theory had
been adopted in the License Cases, and that the commerce clause imposed no limitation on the
taxing power of the states. Id. at 470-I, 479-82.
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in the development of the negative implications of the commerce clause,
buf the truculent pertinacity with which the Justices clung to their diverse
theories made it obvious that a new compromise was necessary. Marshall's
attempt to win over the adherents of the concurrent theory had failed.
The new compromise theory was not long in coming. It was an-
nounced,94 appropriately, by a new member of the Court, justice Curtis,
in Cooley v. Board of Wardens95 in 1852. The case involved the validity of
a state law requiring vessels to pay half of the pilotage fees whether they
used a local pilot or not. This statute was held to be a regulation of com-
merce rather than of police.96 Nevertheless it was upheld on the ground
that the power of Congress over such matters was not exclusive. The com-
promise doctrine was stated as follows:
The diversities of opinion, therefore, which have existed on this subject, have arisen
from the different views taken of the nature of this power .... Now the power to
regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly
various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single
uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port;
and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity,
which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of this power requires exclusive
legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this power, and
to assert concerning all of them, what is really applicable but to a part. Whatever sub-
jects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan
of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage
is plain.97
justice Curtis made it clear that his decision was not based on any dele-
gation of power to the states by Congress. A federal statute of 1789 pro-
vided that all pilots should continue to be regulated by existing state laws
and those thereafter to be enacted, until further legislation by Congress.
The state statute in question was enacted in 1803. justice Curtis stated
that its validity could not be made to depend on the Act of 1789. "If the
94 Justice Woodbury bad already suggested the possibility of reconciling the exclusive and
concurrent theories by an approach somewhat similar to that adopted by his successor. Li-
cense Cases, 5 How. (U.S.) 504, 624-5 (x847); Passenger Cases, 7 How. (UT.S.) 283, 559-61
(1849).
95 12 How. (U.S.) 299 (1852).
96 Id. at 317. The opinion in this case did not purport to abandon the classification doctrine.
Instead it further curtailed the field in which the exclusive theory is operative. See Fanning v.
Gregoire, 16 How. (U.S.) 524 (1854), holding the grant of an exclusive franchise to operate an
interstate ferry to be within the "police" power of a state, hence valid in the silence of Congress.
97 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (U.S.) 299, 319 (1852) (italics added). Justice
Daniel, concurring specially, argued that Congress had no power at all as to matters demand-
ing diversity of treatment. Id. at 325-6.
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states were divested of the power to legislate on this subject by the grant
of the commercial power to Congress, it is plain this act could not confer
upon them power thus to legislate." ' The only effect of the federal stat-
ute was to indicate Congress' belief that the subject of pilotage was not
one demanding uniformity of regulation 99 In the instant case this coin-
cided with the opinion of the Court. In cases where Congress has ex-
pressed no opinion the Court will determine if the subject is of national
interest or one which demands uniformity according to its understanding
of the needs of commerce. Thus another opportunity for the use of judi-
cial discretion in imposing limitations on the power of the states was
created-which may explain in part the continued favor with which the
Supreme Court has viewed the doctrine of the Cooley case.
= TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM
On the whole it can be said that the "concurrent" interpretation of the
commerce clause was predominant during the term of Chief Justice Taney.
The decade following the Civil War saw the pendulum swing sharply the
other way. The doctrine of state sovereignty, one of the bases of the con-
current theory, was gone and with it the idea that the Constitution was to
be construed as a contract between the states and the federal government.
The personnel of the Supreme Court was almost entirely changed.I°°
Commerce was becoming more and more national in scope and character
as a result of the rapid expansion of railroad and telegraph systems. These
three reasons are ample to explain the change in judicial attitude toward
the commerce clause and state powers.
The first warning of the impending curtailment of state powers came in
Steamship Co. v. PortwardenseoI involving a Louisiana statute which author-
ized the portwardens of New Orleans to collect a fee of five dollars from
every vessel entering the port whether receiving any services or not. The
Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional in a brief and dogmatic
opinion by Chief Justice Chase. "That the act of the legislature of Louisi-
ana is a regulation of commerce can hardly be doubted. It imposes a tax
upon every ship entering the port of New Orleans .... and works the
very mischief against which the Constitution intended to protect com-
9 Id. at 318.
99 Justices McLean and Wayne, dissenting, construed the Act of x789 as reflecting a belief
by Congress that it was necessary to adopt the state laws because they had been automatically
abrogated by the adoption of the Constitution. Id. at 322-3.
100 In z867 only three members of the Court of i86o remained; in 1873, only one. President
Lincoln made five appointments to the Court.
,*1 6 Wall. (U.S.) 31 (1867).
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merce among the States.' 'I °2 No authority for this statement was cited.
The exclusive theory was applied as a matter of course and the Cooley case
was distinguished by pointing out that here Congress had not sanctioned
the state statute and there was no element of contract as there was in the
case of the half pilotage fee. As a second ground of decision, Chief Justice
Chase held the tax void as a duty on tonnage, construed to include any
duty levied on a ship as such. The presence of this narrow alternative
ground and the lack of reasoning and discussion of precedent make the
case of little weight as an authority.
In Woodruff v. Parham,° 3 Justice Miller proposed, by way of dictum, a
new limitation on the power of the states. This case involved the validity
of a municipal ordinance imposing a tax on auctioneers measured by the
proceeds of their sales, as applied to an auctioneer selling in their original
packages goods imported from other states. Justice Miller upheld the tax
in spite of the contention that the case was governed by Brown v. Mary-
land. The word "imports," said he, as used in the Constitution refers only
to goods introduced from foreign countries. Marshall's further suggestion
that the commerce clause impliedly prohibits state taxation of original
package sales of interstate imports °4 was limited to the facts of the Brown
case, i.e., to a discriminatory tax. The opinion concluded thus:
But, we may be asked, is there no limit to the power of the States to tax the produce
of their sister States brought within their borders? And can they so tax them as to
drive them out or altogether prevent their introduction or their transit over their
territory?
The case before us is a simple tax on sales of merchandise, imposed alike upon all
sales made in Mobile, whether the sales be made by a citizen of Alabama or of another
State, and whether the goods sold are the produce of that State or some other. There
is no attempt to discriminate injuriously against the products of other States or the
rights of their citizens, and the case is not, therefore, an attempt to fetter commerce
among the States, or to deprive the citizens of other States of any privilege or immu-
nity possessed by citizens of Alabama. But a law having such operation would, in our
opinion, be an infringement of the provisions of the Constitution which relate to those
subjects, and therefore void. There is also, in addition to the restraints which those
2Id. at 33. ,o0 8 Wall. (U.S.) 123 (I869).
104 "We suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply equally to importations from
a sister State. We do not mean to give any 'opinion on a tax discriminating between foreign
and domestic articles." Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 449 (1827). A possible
explanation of why Marshall did not base the decision in Brown v. Maryland on the discrim-
inatory nature of the tax is that he held an absolute view of governmental power. "Questions
of power do not depend on the degree to which it may be exercised. If it may be exercised at
all, it must be exercised at the will of those in whose hands it is placed." Id. at 439. To his
mind to say that the state could tax an importing dealer uniformly with other merchants
would necessarily imply that an unequal and prohibitory tax would also be valid.
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provisions impose by their own force on the States, the unquestioned power of Con-
gress, under the authority to regulate commerce among the States, to interpose, by the
exercise of this power, in such a manner as to prevent the States from any oppressive
interference with the free interchange of commodities by the citizens of one State with
those of anotherxos
Justice Miller amplified and varied his reasoning, again by way of dic-
tum, in Hinson v. Lot,"°6 decided on the same day. A tax discriminating
against the products of other states would, he said, be void as a regulation
of commerce in respect of a matter of national interest under the doctrine
of the Cooley case. The rule to be deduced from the opinion seems to be
that a tax will be regarded as a forbidden "regulation" if its effect is to
"seriously affect the interchange of commodities, ' X  and it is so intended
by the legislature xo8
The doctrine announced by Justice Miller in these two cases found
little support in the authorities."' 9 It can be rationalized in two ways.
First, it could be urged that the primary purpose of the constitutional pro-
visions in regard to commerce is to prevent discriminatory action by states
resulting in a burden on commerce and causing irritation among the states.
It would be folly to circumscribe the action of the states in other respects
and leave them free to produce the same evils by means of internal taxa-
tion. Hence the prohibition of discriminatory taxation can be regarded as
a "resulting" limitation on state power.Y0 The apparent reliance on the
privileges and immunities clause of Article IV as an analogy in Woodruff v.
Parham is evidence that Miller did follow this line of reasoning. But, as
ZoS Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 123, 14o (1869).
'0 8 Wall. (U.S.) 148 (1869), holding valid a state tax of Soc per gallon on the sale of im-
ported liquor where there was a similar tax levied upon the distillation of liquor in the state.
107Id. at 151.
zog Speaking of the tax described in note io6 sup'a, Miller, J., said, 'We do not see in it an
attempt to regulate commerce, but an appropriate and legitimate exercise of the taxing power
of the States." Id. at 153. One wonders whether the Court realized that the tax in question
was in fact discriminatory. Thus if each state were to adopt such a system of taxation it is
obvious that, all other things being equal, imported liquor would cost the consumer 5oc more
per gallon than the domestic product.
log In addition to the Brown and Cooley cases, neither of which supported his position, Miller
cited Almy v. California, 24 How. (U.S.) 169 (i86i), holding a tax on bills of lading invalid as a
duty on exports, and Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 35 (1868), holding invalid a tax on
passengers leaving the state. In the latter case only Chase, C. J., and Clifford, J., put the de-
cision on the commerce clause. Miller himself wrote the majority opinion which refused to find
the tax a regulation of commerce in a matter of national concern within the doctrine of the
Cooley case.
110 For an analogous proposition, i.e., that Congress possesses "resulting" powers, see Legal
Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457, 534-7 (1872), per Strong, J.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
noted above," z the presence of that clause in the Constitution raises an
inference that no corresponding protection to goods of extrastate origin
was intended. Moreover, there is the difficulty of getting around the
proposition that the Constitution contains no implied limitations on the
taxing power of the states.
The second possible rationalization avoids these objections to a large
extent. It starts with the doctrine of the Cooley case that the power of
Congress is exclusive as to the regulation of commercial subjects of na-
tional concern, among which is the interstate movement of goods. No
state can directly hamper such movement by commercial regulations, that
is, where the purpose is to aid domestic commercial interests. It follows
that although a state can impose bonafide taxes on the subjects and con-
duct of commerce, it cannot use its taxing power as a colorable device to
further commercial ends. It cannot do indirectly what it cannot do direct-
ly. The discriminatory nature of the tax betrays the real legislative mo-
tive. Upon this analysis the doctrine of these cases can be considered as a
modification of the classification doctrine announced in Gibbons v.
Ogden.1
2
A far more revolutionary doctrine was not only announced but applied
in the State Freight Tax Case.13 A Pennsylvania statute laid a tax of from
two to five cents per ton on all freight transported by a common carrier by
rail or water any distance within the state. A railroad company resisted
payment of the tax on coal shipped from within the state to a point out-
side, and was sustained in its contention by the United States Supreme
Court. Justice Strong delivered the majority opinion." 4
The payment of that tax is a condition, upon which is made dependent the prosecu-
tion of this branch of commerce. And as there is no limit to the rate of taxation she
may impose, if she can tax at all, it is obvious the condition may be made so onerous
that an interchange of commodities with other States would be rendered impossible.
.... Such an imposition, whether large or small, is a restraint of the privilege or right
to have the subjects of commerce pass freely from one State to another without being
obstructed by the intervention of State lines. It would hardly be maintained, we think,
that had the State established custom-houses on her borders .... and demanded at
these houses a duty for allowing merchandise to enter or leave the State .... such an
imposition would not have been a regulation of commerce with her sister States. Yet it
See p. 561 supra.
The doctrine of the Woodruff case has been applied to invalidate state police regulations
as well as taxes. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (189O); Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62
(189).
-3 x5 Wall. (U.S.) 232 (1873).
n4 Swayne and Davis, JJ., construed the tax as a valid tax on the business of the carriers.
Id. at 282.
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is difficult to see any substantial difference between the supposed case and the one we
have in hand ..... Nor can it make any difference that the legislative purpose was to
raise money for the support of the State government, and not to regulate transporta-
tion. It is not the purpose of the law, but its effect, which we are now considering. Nor
is it at all material that the tax is levied upon all freight, as well that which is wholly
internal as that embarked in interstate trade.us
And since the subject demands uniformity of regulation under the doc-
trine of the Cooley case, the "regulation" here is unconstitutional., 6
This decision is based on the exclusive theory as modified by the Cooley
case. The first difficulty came in squaring it with Marshall's classification
doctrine."17 Justice Strong eliminated the necessity of this by blandly
throwing the latter overboard. The second and greater difficulty came in
reconciling the decision with the orthodox view that the Constitution con-
tains no implied limitations on the taxing power of the states."" Two lines
of reasoning were resorted to. Payment of the tax is a condition imposed
upon persons engaging in interstate commerce; the imposition of condi-
tions is regulation; the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce
was completely surrendered to Congress; therefore the state has no power
to levy the tax. Not only does this beg the question by a process of de-
fining terms, but it proves too much, i.e., that a state property tax on rail-
road rights-of-way would be invalid. Again, state customs duties on inter-
state exports and imports are forbidden, therefore interstate commerce is
to be free of state-imposed burdens: the tax in issue is a burden, therefore
it is forbidden. Non sequitur, of course. It does not follow that because
the Constitution can be reasonably construed to prohibit the states from
imposing certain restraints on interstate commerce, such commerce has a
constitutional immunity from all state-imposed restraints. No attempt
was made to explain away Hamilton's statements in The Federalist,1 9 and
repeated by Story in his Commentaries,12o or the inference which may be
drawn from the presence of certain specific limitations on the taxing power
of the states in the Constitution."' It is not exaggerating to say that the
decision in the State Freight Tax Case, one of the most important ever
made under the commerce clause, was reached in disregard of authority
and was based on faulty logic and dubious policy.
xs Id. at 276-7. u6 .d, at 279-8o.
117 Seep. 570 supra. It will be recalled that Marshall himself had later questioned the po-
sition that the exclusive theory could never be applied to state taxation. See p. 572 supra.
1,8 See p. 572 supra. It is surprising to find Justice Clifford stating a few years later that it is
a "settled rule of construction" that "the commercial clause of the Constitution neither confers,
regulates, nor prohibits taxation." Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 285 (1878).
x19 See note 74 supra. -0' See note 77 supra. 121 See p. 562 supra.
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Justice Miller's rule might be summarized thus: state taxes which (in-
tentionally) burden interstate commerce (more than intrastate commerce)
are forbidden regulations of interstate commerce. Justice Strong's is the
same, omitting the words in parentheses. But it immediately became ap-
parent that this rule was too broad. On the same day that it was an-
nounced, the Court in the case of State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts 22
upheld a tax of that type. justice Strong distinguished the first case by
saying, "It is not everything that affects commerce that amounts to a
regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution." And, he said,
the Constitution should not be construed to destroy the revenue sources
of the states.123 This seems to leave the matter entirely within the discre-
tion of the Court.
A few years later, in his opinion in Sherlock v. Alling, 4 Justice Field de-
vised a method of glossing over awkward problems of distinguishing cases
such as were presented in State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts."- The
method was to draw the line between "direct" burdens on and regulations
of interstate commerce and those "indirect" in effect."2 This formula
amounts to a substitute for that laid down in the Cooley case. In vague-
ness of meaning, the "direct burden" doctrine exceeds all the rest; it
leaves the Court practically free to decide each case as it wishes." 7 The
Supreme Court has appreciated its advantagesX8 At any rate, justice
Field's doctrine has been frequently used, especially in taxation cases.
Another blow at the classification doctrine was struck in Henderson v.
Mayor of New York,1 9 holding invalid a statute requiring the payment of
a fee by the master of the vessel for each immigrant landed. justice Miller
said that it made no difference whether or not this were regarded as an
- IS Wall. (U.S.) 284 (1873).
23 Id. at 293. Justice Miller delivered a vigorous dissenting opinion, in which Field and
Hunt, JJ., concurred, urging that the Constitution be construed to prevent the recurrence in
any form of those burdens and restrictions on commerce which were its primary cause. Id.
at 297-9.
"24 93 U.S. 99 (1876), holding an interstate carrier by water liable under a state wrongful
death act.
2s I S Wall. (U.S.) 284 (1873).
,A 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876).
"7 "In this case the traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the
interference with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in
its application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of the ex-
pressions, 'direct' and 'indirect interference' with commerce, we are doing little more than
using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which it is reached."
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (i927), per Stone, J., dissenting.
"28 See p. 589 infra. -9 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
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exercise of the police power. It amounted to a regulation of foreign com-
merce as to a subject demanding uniformity and hence was void.130
Almost complete victory for the exclusive theory was attained in the
group of cases just discussed. The police and taxing power exceptions
from its scope had been repudiated, and the field of concurrent power as
blocked out in the Cooley case had been narrowed by a broad interpretation
of the "uniformity" test of that case. Henceforth, the Court was to be
chiefly concerned with the application, rather than the selection, of doc-
trines. There was soon to occur, however, one more interesting and im-
portant development.
THE SILENCE OF CONGRESS AND ITS VOICE
When called upon to translate the doctrine of Woodruff v. Parham into
a decision in Welton v. Missouri ,'3' Justice Field undertook to provide a
new rationalization for the doctrine of the former case.
It is sufficient to hold now that the commercial power [of Congress] continues until
the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation by reason of
its foreign character. That power protects it, even after it has entered the State, from
any burden imposed by reason of its foreign origin .....
The fact that Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific rules to govern
inter-State commerce does not affect the question. Its inaction on this subject, when
considered with reference to its legislation with respect to foreign commerce, is equiva-
lent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free and untrammelled. As the
main object of that commerce is the sale and exchange of commodities, the policy thus
established would be defeated by discriminating legislation like that of Missouri.'32
The meaning of these passages is obscure. A statement made by justice
Field a few years later leads one to conclude that he did not intend to an-
nounce an independent doctrine, but rather to bolster up justice Miller's
argument in Woodruff v. ParhamX33 by suggesting an additional reason
why the result reached in Welton v. Missouri was sound, i.e., because it
coincided with the wishes of Congress. The statement referred to was
made by way of dictum in County of Mobile v. Kimball: 34
Some of them [subjects of commercial regulation] are national in their character,
and admit and require uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the States.....
Here there can of necessity be only one system or plan of regulations, and that Con-
230 Id. at 271-3. Miller, J., adverted to the difficulty of applying the classification doctrine,
and pointed out that Congress had power to enact a similar statute under its commercial pow-
er, the same point made by Story, J. (see p. 574 supra).
131 91 U.S. 275 (1876), holding invalid a license tax on peddlers of goods of extrastate origin.
13 Id. at 282.
033 8 Wall. (U.S.) 123 (x869). See p. 578 supra. 034 102 U.S. 691 (i88i).
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gress alone can prescribe. Its non-action in such cases with respect to any particular
commodity or mode of transportation is a declaration of its purpose that the commerce
in that commodity or by that means of transportation shall be free."S
On the other hand in respect of matters of local concern the silence of
Congress, said the learned Justice, indicates an intent to permit regulation
by the states.'16
All of which adds nothing whatever to the doctrine of the Cooley case
insofar as the results of its application are concerned, since presumably
the Court is to continue to draw the line between matters of national and
those of local concern. Justice Field's effort might be interpreted as an
attempt to conceal the blunt reality of judicial control behind an apparent
deference to the "will" of Congress-conveniently discovered to coincide
with that of the Court. Be that as it may, it is doubtful if the learned
Justice foresaw the end to which his words were to lead.
In Bowman v. Chicago &' R. Co., 3 7 the Supreme Court held that a "dry"
state had no power to prohibit the interstate importation of liquor for use
therein. The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Matthews, consisted
largely of a rather labored attempt to show that the statute must be
classified as a regulation of interstate commerce rather than of police. 3s
He relied chiefly on the point made by Justice Catron in the License
Cases, 39 that the federal commercial power would be really subordinate if
the states in the exercise of their police powers could outlaw traffic in cer-
tain commodities. Hence it was believed necessary to limit the "police"
power branch of the classification doctrine, insofar as prohibition of im-
portation was concerned, to unmerchantable articles such as diseased ani-
mals and decayed food. 40 Such a construction of the classification doc-
trine goes far toward limiting it out of existence. In a strong dissenting
opinion Justice Harlan maintained that the statute fell within the police
power of the state and that that power could be freely exercised in the
absence of conflicting federal legislation.141
The most interesting feature of the case was the twist given by Justice
X5Id. at 697. 136Id. at 698-9. X37 ]25 U.S. 465 (1888).
138 "It is essentially a regulation of commerce among the States within any definition here-
tc're given to that term, or which can be given; and although its motive and purpose are to
perfect the policy of the State of Iowa in protecting its citizens against the evils of intemper-
ance, it is none the less on that account a regulation of commerce." Id. at 493. Reliance was
also put on the extrastate effect of the statute on shippers and carriers. Id. at 486, 498-9.
139 See p. 575 supa.
140 Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (i888).
141 Id. at 509. Waite, C. J., and Gray, J., concurred in the dissent.
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Matthews to justice Field's "silence of Congress ' 1142 idea. 143 The almost
meaningless verbal formula of the County of Mobile case was turned about
and transformed into a proposition of great potential effect. "It [a state]
cannot, without the consent of Congress, express or implied, regulate com-
merce between its people and those of the other States of the Union in
order to effect its end, however desirable such a regulation might be.' 'xi4
This seems to be a declaration that Congress can permit the states to
regulate interstate commerce in respect of matters which the Supreme
Court would classify as those of national concern under the doctrine of the
Cooley case.
Why, in the midst of the process of extending the limitations on state
power under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause,
did the Court make this gesture of abdicating its position to Congress?
It is not improbable that the justices were unsure of their position and
wished to prepare an avenue of graceful retreat by shifting the ultimate
responsibility to Congress. The extension of the negative implications of
the commerce clause had been tremendous in the two decades since the
Civil War.'45 Perhaps the Court was afraid that it had carried things too
fast and too far, particularly in regard to the practical abandonment of
the classification doctrine. Maybe the members of the majority in the
Bowman case, observing the apparent virility of the prohibition move-
ment, doubted whether their own rather unsympathetic attitude toward
142 Borrowed from Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 200 (1927).
'43 It is significant that Justice Field did not concur in this step, but filed a separate con-
curring opinion. Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465, Soo (1888).
144 Id. at 493 (italics added). Again: "If not in contravention of any positive legislation by
Congress, it is nevertheless a breach and interruption of that liberty of trade which Congress
ordains as the national policy, by willing that it shall be free from restrictive regulations."
Id. at 498.
X4s The State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. (U.S.) 232 (1873), was the first decision based
squarely and solely on the exclusive theory. It was followed by Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S.
275 (1876) (tax discriminating against peddlers of imported goods); Henderson v. Mayor of
New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876) (tax on landing of immigrants); Railway Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S.
465 (1878) (import embargo on Texan cattle); Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) (statute
requiring river steamboats to furnish equal accommodations for white and black passengers);
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, io5 U.S. 46o (1882) (tax on all telegraph messages);
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, i4 U.S. 196 (i885) (tax on entire capital stock of for-
eign corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce); Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Illinois, 118
U.S. 557 (1886) (regulation of freight rates on interstate shipments); Robbins v. Taxing Dis-
trict, 120 U.S. 502 (1887) (non-discriminatory tax on drummers); Philadelphia, etc., S. S. Co.
v. Pennsylvania,. 122 U.S. 326 (1887) (franchise tax on domestic corporation measured by
gross receipts). In all of these cases the state legislation was held unconstitutional because of
the exclusive character of the power of Congress over the particular subject-matter.
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that movementl46 reflected the dominant public opinion of the country.
Did national public policy demand that the interstate liquor traffic be
immune from state interference? Perhaps the justices were coming to be-
lieve that a legislature was better equipped to answer such questions than
was a court of law, a belief which may have been shared by the framers of
the Constitution, judging by the language of that document.
Two years later the reasoning of the Bowman case was carried to its
logical conclusion in Leisy v. Hardin,47 holding that a state could not for-
bid "original package" sales of liquor imported from another state, and
overruling the License Cases insofar as they were inconsistent with the
result now reached. 48 Although his opinion is marked by confusion of
thought, Chief Justice Fuller made it clear that Congress could, in effect,
overrule the decision if it wished.
And while by virtue of its jurisdiction over persons and property within its limits, a
State may provide for the security of the lives, limbs, health and comfort of persons
and the protection of property so situated, yet a subject matter which has been con-
fided exclusively to Congress by the Constitution is not within the jurisdiction of the
police power of the State, uinless placed there by congressional action.149
Congress lost no time in accepting the invitation to speak. The Wilson
Act s0 of i8go purported to subject imported liquor to the "police power"
of a state upon its arrival and delivery for use or sale therein regardless of
the form of the package. No better illustration of the artificiality of using
an inference drawn from the silence of Congress as a basis of decision need
be sought.
In the case of In re Rahrer s"' the Supreme Court bowed to the wishes of
Congress and upheld a state statute, enacted prior to the Wilson Act, for-
bidding the sale of liquor by its importer in the original package. The ra-
X46 Cf. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894), upholding state statute forbidding
sale in original packages of imported oleomargarine colored to resemble butter. Presumably
the Court believed the evil here to be greater than in the Bowman Case.
'47 135 U.S. ioo (i8go). Gray, Harlan, and Brewer, JJ., dissented.
148 The dissenting opinion points out that the silence of Congress during the forty years that
the License Cases were regarded as the law of the land is strong evidence of approval of the
results there reached, rather than, as the majority would have it, a mute protest against those
decisions. Id. at 16o.
'49 Id. at Yog (italics added). It would seem that Chief Justice Fuller was preparing for the
task of rationalization to come by suggesting that the state statute was an exercise of the
police power, thus departing somewhat from the position taken in the Bowman case. But Cf.
id. at iiS, where the statute appears to have been regarded as a regulation of commerce. See
also id. at i19, where occurs a passage which seems to imply that Congress could change the
result in the Bowman case by "reclassifying" the state statute as an exercise of the police
power.
ISO 26 Stat. 313 (18go); 27 U.S.C.A. § 121 (i935). 151 4o U.S. 545 (189I)-
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tionalization of this result as drawn from the opinion of Chief Justice
Fuller runs something as follows: the power of Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce as to subjects national in nature is exclusive.' 52 The police
power of the states is concurrent with the commercial power of Congress
in all cases, subject of course to being superseded by an exercise of the
federal power.' s3 In matters of national concern the silence of Congress is
construed as the indication of a desire that such matters be free of all regu-
lation, and this "will" of Congress supersedes all inconsistent state stat-
utes even though enacted under the concurrent police power.3 4 Hence
there is no question of delegation of power, or of reviving an unconstitu-
tional statute. The Wilson Act merely removed an "impediment" which
had rendered the state statute inoperative, just as the repeal of a statute
forbidding state action would do.'-5
It is submitted that this rationalization is basically unsound. If the
commerce clause of the Constitution imposes no restraints on the police
power of the states, as the opinion seems to assume, then any limitation
upon the exercise of such power must be based upon the supremacy clause
of Article VI which provides that "the Laws of the United States which
shall be made .... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."'16 It is carry-
ing things a bit too far to say that Congress is "making laws" by its very
refusal to make laws, and that its unexpressed intentions and desires are
the "supreme law of the land.' 57 It follows that there can be no warrant
in the Constitution for the proposition that the silence of Congress can
in any way limit or restrain the exercise of a state power.'58 Furthermore,
Is Id. at 5.
1s3 Id. at 554-7. Gibbons v. Ogden was relied on for this proposition-the classification
doctrine.
XS4 Id. at 555-6.
- Id. at 564. For a full discussion and presentation of this interpretation of the opinion, see
Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 200 (1927). It should be noted that the
Court's reasoning would not apply to a case where the state legislation was classified as com-
mercial regulation, as was the situation in the Bowman case (see p. 584 supra).
XS6 Quoted in full in note 33 supra.
'57 Possibly Chief Justice Waite was seeking to explain away this absurdity when he said,
"The power of regulation may be exercised without legislation as well as with it. By refraining
from action, Congress, in effect, adopts as its own regulations those which the common law
.... has provided for the government of such business." Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 490
(1878). Justice Story had thrown out a similar suggestion in The Chusan, 2 Story 455, 465,
Fed. Cas. no. 2717 (C. C. Mass. 1843). Even so, the difficulty remains, since the common law
cannot be the supreme law of the land until Congress "makes" it such by affirmative action.
I0 The statement is not intended to cast any doubt on the "occupation of the field" doctrine
(see note 12 supra). Even in that case the restraint on state power is based on negative infer-
ences drawn from the statute of Congress.
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this rationale would deny any effect to a federal statute purporting to per-
mit commercial regulation by the states of matters held by the Court to be
of national interest, the very situation presented in Whitfield v. Ohio.159
Moreover, the practical difficulty involved in trying to ascertain what
Congress intends when it stands silent is so great that the above ration-
alization is patently unreal as a description of the judicial process of decid-
ing a case like Leisy v. Hardin. The "psychoanalysis"' 6 ° of Congress is a
perilous venture when that body speaks 6, and a hopeless task when it is
silent. It would seem that the only sensible course is to hold that when
Congress says nothing it means what it says.
An alternative rationalization might be developed from the statement in
the opinion that Congress can divest articles of their character as subjects
of interstate commerce at a moment earlier than the sale in the original
package.': 2 Of course, it cannot be intended that Congress can finally
draw the line between interstate and internal commerce, since that would
imply that Congress could vary its own power, as well as that of the states,
at will. The statement might be construed to mean that Congress can re-
move the immunity from state action enjoyed by an article moving in
interstate commerce.163 This, however, amounts to saying that Congress
can restore to the states powers impliedly denied to them by the Constitu-
tion. If the Constitution excludes state power to forbid the importation of
liquor because it is an article moving in interstate commerce, it is difficult
to see how Congress could confer that power even if it were to prohibit all
interstate movement of liquor.
Before attempting to devise a rationalization of the decision in the
Rahrer case which will be consistent with the accepted doctrines of the
Supreme Court, it will be helpful to consider some recent developments in
those doctrines.
'59 56 Sup. Ct. 532 (1936). See p. 557 supra, and p. 59o infra.
16o United States v. Constantine, 56 Sup. Ct. 223, 228 (1935), per Cardozo, J., dissenting.
x6' For a famous instance in which the Court misconstrued the "voice" of Congress, see
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. (U.S.) 518 (1852); result reversed by act of
Congress, same case, i8 How. (U.S.) 421 (1856).
1
6
2In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (i8gi). At another point the opinion speaks of Congress'
allowing "imported property to fall at once upon arrival within the local jurisdiction." Id. at
564. The opinion in the Whitfield case seems to adopt this rationalization. See excerpt quoted
on p. 557 supra.
163 See Powell, The Validity of State Legislation under the Webb-Kenyon Law, 2 So. L. Q.
-12 (1917), for a discussion of this and other possible rationalizations of the decision in the
RaPirer case. Professor Powell did not seem aware of the basic flaw in the silence of Congress
doctrine as pointed out above.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In 1913 Justice Hughes, in his opinion in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 64
undertook to collect and classify the previous cases dealing with the nega-
tive implications of the commerce clause for the purpose of deducing
therefrom the controlling principles. The fundamental principle he stated
thus: "If a state enactment imposes a direct burden upon interstate com-
merce, it must fall regardless of Federal legislation."' 6 The doctrine of the
Cooley case was also reaffirmed,,66 as was the classification doctrine in a
limited form.x6 7 Apparently the "direct burden" test was regarded as the
equivalent of that applied under the Cooley doctrine,'68 although the two
are, in theory, based on quite different grounds and may conceivably lead
to opposite results in some cases. 69 The Cooley doctrine looks to the sub-
ject-matter of the regulation; the "direct burden" doctrine to the inci-
dence and effect of the regulation upon the conduct of interstate com-
merce.
The emphasis placed on the "direct burden" test was bound to further
weaken the effect of the classification doctrine which, as has been seen,
had already suffered extensive curtailment in the State Freight Tax, 70
Hendersonr71, and Bomana' 72 cases. It focuses attention on the effect of the
state legislation rather than upon the motive of the legislature. This
tendency was carried to the extreme in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania73 wherein
the Court held unconstitutional a statute requiring steamship ticket
"64 230 U.S. 352, 396-412 (193).
165 Id. at 396. See p. 582 supra, for the origin of this doctrine.
16 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399-400 (1913).
67 Id. at 4o6-8. The states were conceded to have power to forbid the importation of arti-
des dangerous to health, and those susceptible of fraudulent disposition (id. at 408), but not of
"legitimate articles of commerce" such as liquor (id. at 4oi) where the danger presumably is to
morals. The taxing power was grouped with the commercial power and definitely put outside
the scope of the classification doctrine (id. at 400).
x68 Id. at; 400.
x69 E.g., the decision in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. (U.S.) 713 (i866), that the erection
of a bridge across a navigable stream was within the state's power because the subject was
suited to diverse regulation, might have gone the other way if the destruction of plaintiff's
carrying business had been the point of approach.
Ix7 P. 58I suipra. '7X P. 582 supra. '72 P. 584 supra.
'7' 273 U.S. 34 (1927). Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, JJ., dissented in opinions by the latter
two. Cf. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (z894).
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agents to be bonded to protect the public against fraud. Justice Butler
stated the basis of decision:
A state statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens
foreign commerce is a prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the purpose with
which it was passed ..... Such legislation cannot be sustained as an exertion of the
police power of the State to prevent possible fraud.174
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has more recently relied upon
the classification doctrine to uphold a state regulation which directly
burdened interstate commerce. In Bradley v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion,'7' an order denying permission to operate as an interstate motor
carrier was upheld on the ground that the purpose of the denial was to pre-
vent dangerous congestion on the highway. Buck v. Kuykendall 76 was dis-
tinguished on the ground that there the purpose of the refusal was to pre-
vent competition with existing carriers, a motive rendering the regulation
"commercial."
In this connection the stress placed upon the purpose of the legislation
in Baldwin v. Seelig177 is significant. Indeed the opinion in that case carries
the restrictive aspect of the classification doctrine further than ever be-
fore. According to the language of Justice Cardozo, quoted at the outset
of this paper, T8 all state regulations enacted with the purpose and having
the effect of suppressing extrastate competition are unconstitutional re-
gardless of the incidence of the regulation. Thus, in that case not only
was the restriction upon the sale of imported milk in original packages
held invalid, but that upon the sale in broken packages as well, a transac-
tion uniformly classed as internal commerce. 79 The supposed intent of
the framers of the Constitution to remove all interstate trade barriers was
chiefly relied upon, 8° although some attempt was made to find a "direct
burden" because of the legislative intent to curtail interstate commerce.18'
The general tenor of the opinion is similar to that of Justice Miller in
Woodruff v. Parkam.'8 2 No mention was made of the silence of Congress.
In spite of the broad statements and emphatic language used in the
Seelig case, the Supreme Court in Whitfield v. Ohiol' 3 held that a state can
174HI. at,37. 175 289 U.S. 92 (1933).
',1 267 U.S. 307 (1925), holding invalid a similar state order.
X77 294 U.S. 511 (935). 17 p. 556 supra.
'7' In the trial court the latter regulation was upheld on this ground, although the former was
held invalid. Seelig v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 776, 779 (N.Y. 1934), per L. Hand, J. The opinion
points out the inconsistency of the classification doctrine with the "direct burden" doctrine.
ISO Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 522-3 (1935).
.
81 Id. at 522. This seems to be a departure from the objective character of that test.
182 See p. 578 supra. 18 5 6 Sup. Ct. 532 (1936).
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forbid the sale of imported convict-made goods in broken packages and,
with the consent of Congress, in original packagesI 84 Putting the federal
statute to one side for the moment, how can these cases be reconciled?
Not upon diversity in the purpose of the legislation, since in each case it
was designed to protect local producers against extrastate competition of
the same type-underselling because of lower production costs; nor upon
the humanitarian ground of discouraging the exploitation of forced labor
for private profit, since that can be no more the legitimate concern of the
state of destination than would be the employment of any persons at less
than a living wage; nor yet upon a difference in the directness of the bur-
dens. There is, however, one method 8s of explaining the decisions, if not
of reconciling the opinions.
There is one very significant difference in the facts of the two cases.
The business of producing and distributing milk is an industry of the
first rank in this country, whereas that concerned with convict-made
goods is insignificant. If New York were permitted to tinker with the
distributing end of the milk marketing system, severe dislocations of the
entire system might follow causing loss to thousands of dealers and pro-
ducers in other states who had invested their labor and capital in the faith
that the free interstate marketing system would continue. No conse-
quences of comparable gravity can flow from the action of Ohio. In short,
the national interest in securing to the milk industry a free nationwide
market is vastly greater than that in affording similar protection to prison
industries. The former is deemed sufficient to override the legitimate and
praiseworthy interest an individual state may have in improving the
economic position of its producers; the latter is not. May not the Court
really, underneath all the doctrines and formulas, be deciding these com-
merce clause cases by balancing conflicting interests, the national against
184 See quotation on p. 557 supra.
Ss A distinction might be drawn on the ground that the New York statute discriminates
against imported goods whereas the Ohio statute does not. The purchase of milk in Vermont
and its importation into New York were entirely lawful acts. Hence the title of the importer in
New York was as perfect as that of an owner of milk produced in that state who had paid the
statutory price therefor. Yet the former was forbidden to sell his milk and the latter permitted,
a discrimination which, it could be urged, was based on the origin of the goods. The Ohio
statutes, on the other hand, forbid all persons to sell convict-made goods, of whatever origin,
upon the open market. The distinction disappears, however, if the New York statutes are read
as forbidding the sale of all milk, of whatever origin, whose producers received less than the
statutory price.
Incidentally one wonders why counsel for Whitfield did not rely on the equal protection
clause. Is it reasonable to classify the shirts on a merchant's shelf, which are of- identical kind
and quality, according to the conditions under which they were manufactured in other states?
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the local?"8 6 And would this not be the most desirable approach after
all?,58 The Court's failure openly to espouse it as a rule of decision is not
surprising. That tribunal is naturally somewhat reluctant to hold itself
out as the director of major economic policies when it already is in a posi-
tion to exercise a large degree of discretion by selecting that one of the di-
verse and mutually inconsistent doctrines at hand, which will lead to the
result deemed best under the circumstances. Then there are fundamental
principles of constitutional interpretation to be reckoned with, as well as
the various subordinate doctrines, each supported by scores of Court
opinions over many years.
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
It is submitted that there is a way out which will not involve an out-
right abandonment of these intrenched doctrines and which will not stray
from accepted principles of constitutional interpretation. It involves, of
course, the creation of a new doctrine, but one more flexible than the old
and hence more workable.
The basic proposition would be that of the Cooley case, that the com-
merce clause of itself excludes some state action in relation to certain sub-
jects, but not all state action as to all subjects. Instead of considering
only the subject-matter of the regulation, the inquiry would extend to a
consideration of all the circumstances of the case. The test would be that
already suggested-which interest, that of state or nation, should pre-
vail. s8  This involves no greater departure from sound constitutional
interpretation than did the Cooley case itself. The long step was taken in
I852 when the Supreme Court assumed the power to apply either the ex-
clusive or the concurrent theory of interpretation in its discretion.
x$6 The above suggestion would go far to explain the decision in Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S.
31 (igo8), that a state may prohibit the possession of lawfully-acquired, imported game birds
during the dosed season on such birds in that state, a decision which has been hard to square
with accepted doctrine. See Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935). Cf. Bayside Fish
Flour Co. v. Gentry, 56 Sup. Ct. 513 (z936).
Perhaps the suggestion also provides the key to reconciling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S.
519 (1896), upholding a state export embargo on game birds lawfully killed, with Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. i (1928), contra as to export embargo on unshelled
shrimp; and Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (igo8), upholding export
embargo on river water, with Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923), Contra as to
export embargo on natural gas. See Frankfurter and Freund, Interstate Commerce, 8 Soc.
Sci. Ency. 220, 222, 226 (1932).
187 This suggestion is neither original nor novel. See the dissenting opinion of Stone, J., in
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43-5 (1927), quoted in part in note 127 supra; argu-
ment of counsel in Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 513 (1935).
is Cf. the language of the opinion in the Cooley case, "whatever subjects of this power are
in their nature national." (See p. 576 supra, for context.)
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The next step would be finally to abandon the classification doctrine as
an ultimate determinant, and transform it into a method of approach.
The purpose of the state legislation should be an important factor to be
considered in determining whether in a given case the interest of the state
should or should not prevail. Thus a statute intended to prevent the
spread of disease might be upheld in a situation where a similar regulation
based on any other motive might be invalidated. In cases where the na-
tional interest is strong, however, and the danger to health slight, the
federal power might well be held exclusive. On the other hand, as in the
Whitfield case, the fact that the motive of the state legislature is to further
the economic interests of its people should not preclude a finding of state
power. Because of the absence of a legitimate state interest, the result in
a case involving discriminatory state legislation would be the same as that
now reached.
In much the same way the incidence of the burden of the regulation,
whether direct or indirect, could be considered as a factor in reaching the
final determination. This particular approach has been most frequently
applied in taxation cases in the past. It is useful in such cases but it
should not be the only factor considered. Weight would also be given,
under the proposed doctrine, to the revenue needs of the state and to the
possible injustice of casting an unequal tax load on intrastate competitors.
No significance, of course, would be attached to the silence of Congress,
for reasons pointed out above. But not so as to the "voice of Congress."
The Whitfield case indicates that the expressed intention of Congress to
permit state action does have a practical effect. The next problem is to
square this result with theory. This leads to the second part of the sug-
gested solution.
As has already been seen, the silence of Congress can be no impediment
to state action; hence in the absence of any federal legislation, all limita-
tions on the states must be derived directly from the Constitution. But, if
so, how explain the decision of the Rahrer case? Can Congress remove a
constitutional limitation? No, but Congress can alter other factors so that
certain state action no longer falls within the constitutional prohibition.
We start with the proposition that the commerce clause is to be con-
strued to exclude directly state power in situations where the national
interest in having interstate traffic free from state restraints is stronger
than the local interest in question. The next proposition is that Congress
is the proper body to balance these conflicting interests. It follows that
when Congress assents to certain state action under specified circum-
stances, it amounts to a finding that in that particular situation the state
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interest is dominant, a finding which the Supreme Court should and will
follow in subsequent cases. 89 In the silence of Congress the Court, per-
force, must balance the interests according to its view of sound policy, just
as a court must decide ordinary causes in the absence of applicable legisla-
tion. In the former case, as in the latter, when the legislature does an-
nounce a different policy, it should prevail as the policy of the nation.
There is no difficulty in reconciling this solution with accepted constitu-
tional principles. Congress has the undisputed power to restrict the area
in which state action is permitted by the Supreme Court. Why can it not
expand that area as well? The objection that Congress cannot define the
limits of its own power is not in point;190 Congress is regulating subjects
which are conceded to be within its power. Nor, under the suggested in-
terpretation of the commerce clause, is Congress delegating power to the
states. It is determining the national policy, an ordinary and proper legis-
lative function. The Constitution, according to the proposed view, pro-
hibits state action which is in conflict with national policy; a change in
that policy may result in removing the restraint, but it does not alter the
interpretation of the Constitution itself.
Another possible objection is that the Constitution itself contemplates
and demands uniformity of commercial regulations in regard to certain
important matters-the argument which prevailed with the Court in re-
spect to the admiralty jurisdiction of Congress.'9' To this two answers can
be made. In the first place, there is no warrant for this contention in the
language of the Constitution. The presence of express requirements of
uniformity in relation to the taxing, naturalization, and bankruptcy pow-
ers, 192 and of equality of treatment in the regulation of ports 93 raises an
inference that no such limitations on the general commercial power were
intended. 94 Moreover, Congress is expressly authorized to permit the
2'9See Reynolds, op. cit. supra note *, 147-55, for a similar suggestion and arguments in its
support.
go Nevertheless it has been seriously advanced. See Bikl6, op. cFi. supra note iss, at 213.
Cf. Powell, op. cit. supra note 163, at 135-6.
19, See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); and Washington v. Dawson
& Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924), holding that Congress cannot permit state workmen's compensa-
tion acts to be applied to maritime workers. For criticism of the result, see Morrison, Work-
men's Compensation and the Maritime Law, 38 Yale L. J. 472, 477-83 (1929).
'9' U.S. Const., art. i, § 8, cl. 1, 4. '93 U.S. Const., art. z, § 9, cl. 6.
94 Chief Justice Marshall's statement on this point is classic. "It is the power to regulate;
that is,.to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl-
edges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain
terms." Gibbons y. Ogden, 9"Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 196 (I824).
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imposition of customs duties by the states,-' thus leading to diversity in
respect of a matter in which Congress itself must act uniformly. Secondly,
the Supreme Court in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co.196
held that the commercial power of Congress was not subject to the re-
quirement of uniformity.
From the practical standpoint the arguments in favor of the voice of
Congress doctrine as here outlined far outweigh those to the contrary. The
regulation of commerce, like taxation, is a "practical" matter-by which
is meant that the effect on individuals is so great, largely because of the
tendency of competitive forces to amplify any inequality in the effect of
the legislation, that logic alone is not a safe guide. According to the sug-
gested "balance of interest" doctrine, the "correct" delimitation of the
sphere of state power requires a knowledge of a tremendous number and
variety of facts, and involves a series of intelligent choices between alter-
native systems of governmental control. True, a court can handle this
problem-indeed, it must when Congress stands silent. But Congress is a
far more suitable body to perform this function. It is in an immensely su-
perior position in respect of gathering facts and forecasting future develop-
ments. More important, it is the policy-formulating branch of the govern-
ment. Congress has always actively and intelligently sought to guide the
commercial development of the nation by affirmative legislative action.
It has helped certain industries by protective tariffs, loans, and subsidies;
it has hampered others by burdensome special taxes. The determination
of the extent to which a given commercial activity should be free from
state regulation and taxation falls in the same general category-it too
may make or break. Again, Congress can, by drawing the line with more
precision and in greater detail than can the Supreme Court, which deals of
necessity in generalities, eliminate much of the uncertainty in this field of
constitutional law, a gain of great importance to both state governments
and private industry.' 97
Against these arguments can be set the contention that diversity in the
regulation of certain commercial activities would be so inimical to the
national welfare that even Congress should not be able to sanction it.
This argument assumes that Congress may at some future time err so
grossly in determining where the balance of interest lies that the Supreme
19S U.S. Const., art. z, § 1o, c. 2. Set out on p. 562 supra.
19 242 U.S. 311, 326-31 (1917), holding valid a federal statute forbidding the carriage of
liquor into any state for use in violation of the laws thereof. For a critical discussion of this
case, see Powell, op. cit. supra note 163.
'97 See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 264-7 (i918), per
Brandeis, J., dissenting.
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Court will be convinced of the mistake. So far the Supreme Court has
been willing to follow the lead of Congress, even when contrary to its own
previous-albeit somewhat hesitant-conception of sound policy, as in the
liquor cases. What it would do in the assumed case cannot be predicted.
It is not unlikely that the Court will have an opportunity to clarify its
position in the relatively near future. A bill to permit state taxation of
interstate sales transactions has been proposed;98 and the Whitfield deci-
sion invites a new attack on the child labor problem along the lines of the
Hawes-Cooper Act. 99
The negative implications of the commerce clause have undergone a
most intricate and interesting evolution. The variety of doctrines which
have been advanced from time to time by members of the Supreme Court
and the decided shifts in the position taken by that tribunal are truly re-
markable. Generally speaking, the trend from the beginning has been
toward limiting the scope of state power, but there has been a decided
change in the conceptions of public policy which have led the Court to
pursue this course. Originally, the Supreme Court felt called upon to curb
the states in order to protect the prerogatives of Congress; Marshall,
Story, and McLean were motivated by a desire to build up a strong cen-
tral government. After the Civil War, the chief objective of the Supreme
Court seems to have been, and to be, the elimination of all state interfer-
ence with interstate commerce. The ideal now is freedom of trade; the
merchant has supplanted Congress as the object of the Court's solicitude.
The final development has been the appearance of Congress as an ally of
its onetime rivals, the state legislatures.
It may well be that the future disputes over the negative implications
of the commerce clause will center largely about the extent of the power
of Congress to permit state regulation. It will be somewhat ironical if the
arguments of Webster and Story, which were advanced to prevent the
states from trespassing upon the domain of Congress, are used to deny to
Congress the power to permit the states to enter.
198 See Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce, 12 N.C. L. Rev.
99 (I934); Lowndes, State Taxation of Interstate Sales, 7 Miss. L. Jour. 223 (I935).
199 At this point the well-known case of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (i918), appears
as a possible barrier. Will the Supreme Court permit Congress and the states acting in concert
to do what it has held that neither Congress nor the states (cf. Baldwin v. Seelig, supra pp. 556,
59o) can do alone? This interesting problem, involving as it does the affirmative interpretation
of the commerce clause, lies beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of Whitfield v.
Ohio from this viewpoint, see note, Power of Congress to Subject Interstate Commerce to
State Regulation, post, p. 636; 49 Harv. L. Rev. 466 (1936).
